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COMMUNITY AND FAIRNESS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY
MARK TUSHNET*
This commentary responds to an article by Lea Brilmayer in
this edition. Professor Tushnet challenges Professor Brilmayer's
assertion regarding democratic theory that the process theory of
United States v. Carolene Products is irreconcilable with the in-
terest theory which stems from conflict of law analysis.
P ROFESSOR Brilmayer's thought-provoking article' directs
our attention to some important anomalies in the ways that
constitutional law and choice of law theory have assimilated some
aspects of democratic theory. Her arguments, however, do not
quite bring those anomalies into focus. By sharpening the focus in
this Commentary, I hope to contribute to the project that Profes-
sor Brilmayer has begun.2 I define that project as reconciling the
claims of community with the claims of fairness.3
I. Two DEMOCRATIC THEORIES OF THE LEGISLATURE
Professor Brilmayer criticizes the "two orthodoxies in the law of
interstate discrimination"-the process theory of United States v.
Carolene Products,5 and interest analysis in the conflict of
laws-for "draw[ing] exactly ...opposite conclusion[s] from the
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., 1967, Harvard University.
M.A., J.D., 1971, Yale University. The author would like to thank L. Michael Seidman for
his comments on a draft of this Commentary.
1. Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a Political Philoso-
phy of Interstate Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 389 (1987) [hereinafter Brilmayer].
2. Along the way I will point out some elisions or minor errors in Professor Brilmayer's
presentation. I devote this note to one that will not come up again. Professor Brilmayer
rejects as "simple-minded" the theory of interpreting statutes that are the product of inter-
est group compromise. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 410. That theory has been developed by
Judge Frank A. Easterbrook. See generally Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the
Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 87 (1984). Professor Brilmayer's dismissal
of this theory is too brusque. As the title of Judge Easterbrook's article suggests, this theory
of statutory interpretation attempts to find a basis in democratic theory for a link between
the roles of legislatures and courts. Professor Brilmayer does not develop a theory of the
judicial role. She relies on the work of Cass Sunstein. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 411 n.34
(citing Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984)).
But that work, to the extent that it has such a theory, is quite problematic.
3. See generally Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a
Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006 (1987).
4. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 393.
5. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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... fact . . . [of] political exclusion." As we will see, they do not
draw "exactly" opposite conclusions; they draw somewhat different
conclusions that seem reconcilable to an outsider to conflict of laws
theory such as me. As Professor Brilmayer hints, the reconciliation
does pose acute problems for a theory of community and fairness.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Professor Brilmayer's analysis of the Carolene Products process
theory places two cases at its center: Arizona's long train law case,
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,7 and Iowa's short truck law case,
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.' She takes my presenta-
tion of the process theory as her primary text.9 Two things seem
out of focus here, and they appear to be related. She develops criti-
cisms of the application of process theories to the Southern Pacific
and Kassel problem. That problem is not usually considered to be
a problem of discrimination, but a problem of "facially neutral
statutes with significant effects on interstate commerce."10
Process theory of the dormant commerce clause" can make
sense of these cases-which I again emphasize usually are not
thought of as cases of interstate discrimination" 2-only by impos-
ing "a general efficiency criterion."' 3 In alluding to the similar effi-
ciency requirement that the Court imposed in Lochner v. New
York,' I had not thought that I was commending a process theory
of these cases.
The word to stress in this context, though, is "general" rather
than "efficiency." Dormant commerce clause doctrine aims to rec-
6. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 395; see also id. at 415 (two methods "inconsistent with
one another").
7. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
8. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
9. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 403 n.21 and accompanying text (citing Tushnet, Rethink-
ing the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125 [hereinafter Tushnet]).
10. G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 290 (1986)
(section heading) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. Note also that the prior section of this
work is headed "Protection against Discrimination." Id. at 258.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12. But see Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 n.12, 676-77
(1981) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.) (discussing significance of exemptions favoring local
interests).
13. Brilrnayer, supra note 1, at 405 (quoting Tushnet, supra note 9, at 143). I agree with
Professor Brilmayer that my argument for this conclusion did not expressly invoke the Coa-
sian point about the reciprocity of externalities, though I believe that my argument does
implicitly rely on the point.
14. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also Tushnet, supra note 9.
COMMUNITY AND FAIRNESS
oncile the states' independent legislative authority with their obli-
gation under the supremacy clause1 to consider national interests.
One might have developed that doctrine so that the commerce
clause prohibited only discrimination, perhaps augmenting the
doctrine with a rule that finding a burden on interstate commerce
that appears to be excessive can be a proxy for finding discrimina-
tion. The Supreme Court has not been so modest. 6 Whether justi-
fied by a process theory or some other, its "undue burden" cases1 7
necessarily rest on the proposition that some national norm con-
strains local preferences. To that extent the supremacy clause pro-
hibits Maine from being too different from Texas.18 Professor
Brilmayer properly notes that democratic values are promoted by
allowing states-and therefore their citizens-to act on different
distributions of preferences.' 9 Dormant commerce clause doctrine
merely establishes that on occasion local preferences must yield to
national norms.20
The problem for democratic theory is that these national norms
are the product of democratic processes as well. This is often ob-
scured by a focus on Supreme Court cases. What matters is that "a
national viewpoint must be inserted in the process."21 I believe
that one gets a better grasp on the problem for democratic theory
by focusing on the power of Congress to preempt local legislation
that either discriminates against" or imposes an undue burden
upon2 interstate commerce."' When the "national viewpoint" is
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
16. But see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652-53 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
17. See, e.g., Kassel Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Southern Pa-
cific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
18. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 407-08.
19. See also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 123-24 (federalism promoting indi-
vidual choice).
20. For those who (unlike me) believe that there is a role for "undue burdens" doctrine,
the problem, of course, is to identify the national norm and the occasions on which it over-
rides local preferences.
21. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 404 (quoting Tushnet, supra note 9, at 143).
22. This was Justice William Johnson's theory of the scope of the commerce clause. See
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 225-26 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (state laws regulating nuclear power plants preempted insofar
as they are based on safety concerns).
24. I believe that dormant commerce clause doctrine would be cleaned up if at least the
"undue burdens" branch were recast as developing a series of canons of construction to be
applied to federal statutes-always present in these situations-to determine whether state
law has been preempted. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 2.
1987]
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provided by Congress, the conflict that federalism creates within
democratic theory is clear: The democratic processes of one con-
stituency, the state, are overridden by the democratic processes of
another, broader constituency, the nation. As Professor Brilmayer
repeatedly emphasizes, there is nothing within democratic theory
in its usual incarnations that justifies imposing the preferences of
the broader constituency on the narrower one.
As I have suggested, the justification, if any, lies in a theory that
would reconcile the claims of community-the local as well as the
national community-with the claims of fairness-those made by
outsiders against the local community, as well as those made by
the local community against the national one. We can get addi-
tional perspective on the problem of developing such a justification
by considering Professor Brilmayer's discussions of interest analy-
sis in conflict of laws theory.
B. Conflict of Laws Theory
I must state at the outset that conflict of laws ranks with oil and
gas law and neurosurgery among the things that I do not want to
learn a lot about. Professor Brilmayer's discussion of interest anal-
ysis does little to make me more enthusiastic, not because of her
presentation but because of the object of her descriptions. For ex-
ample, to the extent that she describes a conflict between some
versions of interest analysis and some versions of process theory,
the constitutional lawyer in me wants to say, "So much worse for
those versions of interest analysis-and why on earth haven't the
conflict theorists figured that out?" But, as we will see, there is
more interesting material here.
Professor Brilmayer argues that interest analysis and process
theories draw contradictory conclusions from the same democratic
premises. Process theories, she says, claim to promote-or at least
not undermine-democracy by forcing local legislatures to take
into account the interests of outsiders. As she says, they place
"special obligations" on legislators "not to discriminate against
those who do not vote."25 In contrast, interest analysis calls upon
the courts to enforce the decisions of a state legislature acting as a
fiduciary for its citizens, under an "obligation to further the inter-
ests of local citizens."26
25. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 396.
26. Id. at 395.
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With respect to at least some problems of conflict of laws, how-
ever, this contradiction is superficial. Consider a problem arising
out of an accident in which a citizen of Connecticut is a passenger
injured in an accident in a car driven by a citizen of New York.
Suppose that under New York law a driver is liable to a guest pas-
senger and that under Connecticut law a driver is not liable to a
guest passenger. According to Professor Brilmayer, interest ana-
lysts would counsel New York courts to deny recovery to the in-
jured Connecticut guest, on the ground that New York has no in-
terest in protecting the interests of out-of-staters. But, she says,
they would insist that the New York driver would be liable to a
New York passenger in similar circumstances. Thus, she argues,
interest analysis urges that states positively discriminate against
outsiders: the Connecticut passenger is disadvantaged by a deci-
sion of a state in which he or she has no influence.
At least in this version of the problem there really is no contra-
diction between interest analysis and process theories. The reason
is analogous to the reciprocal nature of externalities to which Pro-
fessor Brilmayer directs her attention. For one could say that in
this situation the injured Connecticut passenger is disadvan-
taged-not by a decision of New York to follow interest analy-
sis-but by a decision of Connecticut to structure its own law as it
has chosen. If Connecticut passengers are sufficiently concerned
about the threat of uncompensated injury due to New York's invo-
cation of interest analysis (as well as being concerned about the
threat of uncompensated injury due to accidents occurring in Con-
necticut), they face no obvious process difficulties in persuading
their own state legislature to adopt a rule about driver liability like
that of New York. Indeed, one might even say that if New York
insisted on finding the New York driver liable to the Connecticut
passenger, a true process problem would arise: Citizens of Connect-
icut would be governed by a law of a state in which they had no
representation, while their own state makes them bear the cost of
their own injuries.
The confusion in Professor Brilmayer's argument arises from an
interesting ambiguity. In a federal system two constituencies vie
for primacy as sources of democratic legitimacy. Any rule predi-
cated on the promotion of democracy as to one of those constituen-
cies necessarily impairs the promotion of democratic values with
respect to the other. Consider for example the problem addressed
1987]
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in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: 7 the
existence or scope of judicially enforceable limits on Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce. The Court held that there
were no such limits, while four dissenters would have enforced
some limits on Congress' power. Both sides claimed to be promot-
ing democratic values, and both were right. The dissenters cor-
rectly said that by allowing Congress to do whatever it wanted, the
Court effectively licensed Congress to override the decisions made
by local democratic processes. The Court correctly said that to en-
force limitations grounded in concerns about local democracy
would be to override the decisions made by national democratic
processes. To the Court, the people acting in their capacity as citi-
zens of a nationwide democracy chose to disregard decisions made
by the people acting in their capacity as citizens of local democra-
cies-that is, to disregard their own decisions.
The analogue in Professor Brilmayer's argument is clear. Process
theories insist on the importance of democratic processes consider-
ing the nation as the relevant political unit. Interest analysis ap-
pears to insist on the importance of democratic processes consider-
ing each state as the relevant political unit. I confess once again
that as a constitutional lawyer I would have thought that conflict
of laws theory would have figured out that the supremacy clause
stands for the proposition that the latter perspective must yield to
the former. It is not, as Professor Brilmayer suggests, a question of
balancing or accommodation; it is a question of lexical ordering,
wherein some things necessarily come before others..
The lexical ordering, though, solves the problem by mere stipu-
lation. The underlying difficulty is that people in a federal system
are citizens of two "sovereigns," each of which is democratic. What
we need to know is whether it is possible to explain why one sover-
eign's democratic processes ought to prevail over the other's.2 9 Pro-
fessor Brilmayer's analysis of "shaping and sharing" moves us in
the right direction, but it does not bring the solution-if there is
one-into clear view.
27. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
28. This is not to say that the supremacy clause principle must have the content appar-
ently implied by process theories, but only that the supremacy clause principle, whatever it
is, must prevail over the conflicts of laws principle to the extent that the latter is justified
solely with reference to local democracy.
29. The supremacy clause is not an explanation in this sense; it is an expression of the
greater power held by the national government.
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II. COMMUNITY AND FAIRNESS BETWEEN COMMUNITIES
In poetic diction false rhymes such as "shaping and sharing" can
serve to alert us to relations between apparently unrelated sub-
jects. In this context, though, I think the false rhyme is ultimately
misleading. Professor Brilmayer carefully defines "sharing," at the
start, as being "subject[ed] to the benefits and burdens that legal
norms impose."30 In this sense the people of El Salvador "share" in
United States foreign policy. 1 Most of the time, however, "shar-
ing" is a praise word; it is presumptively a good thing to share in
public life. The ambivalence of sharing tends to disappear as Pro-
fessor Brilmayer's exposition proceeds.3 2 To appreciate the di-
lemma of democratic theory that she has exposed, we should keep
her initial perception at hand. It will help to identify some rela-
tively minor preliminary issues.
Professor Brilmayer says that democratic theory typically di-
vides the world into two groups: those affected by a decision who
presumptively have the right to vote, and "those who need not be
allowed to vote because their interests will not be affected."33 She
correctly notes that this ignores "individuals who will be affected
but are not allowed to vote," a fact which "might" give rise to the
negative implication that democratic theory has no "standards for
evaluating the fairness of the relationship between legislators and
affected nonvoters."34 That negative implication need not be
drawn. It arises only because Professor Brilmayer assumes that
those who are actually nonvoters are properly so. Her first formu-
lation was correct: Those who are affected have a presumptive
right to vote, and when legislators affect nonvoters they are pre-
sumptively violating that right."s
The issue then becomes: When is that presumption overcome so
that legislators can affect nonvoters without violating the right to
vote? Professor Brilmayer offers us one testing case-the visiting
nonresident, and I have suggested another-the people of El Sal-
30. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 393.
31. Professor Brilmayer notes that "[international relations have some similar struc-
tural problems." Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 391 n.7.
32. See, e.g., id. at 409 ("refusing to share with outsiders the benefits" of local policy)
(emphasis supplied).
33. Id. at 398.
34. Id.
35. This point is developed in a slightly different way in M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND
BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 2 (forthcoming 1988) [hereinafter
RED, WHITE AND BLUE].
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vador. We can begin with Professor Brilmayer's observation that
when she travels to Florida to give a paper, she is expected to obey
Florida's laws even though she did not share in their creation and
she does not expect to be allowed to vote in any election that oc-
curs during her visit. I defer discussion of the question of voting to
devote attention here to the nonresident visitor's obligation to
obey the law. Process theorists have some catch phrases that cap-
ture the essence of the explanation for that duty-that is, the rea-
son why the presumption is overcome as to nonresident visitors.
The catch phrases are "average reciprocity of advantage" 6 and
"virtual representation. 3 7 The underlying idea is simple: At the
moment the state's general laws are enacted (without the nonresi-
dent's participation), there is no reason to believe that the inter-
ests of residents and nonresidents conflict.38
The general criterion developed by process theorists from this
sort of example has two elements. The presumption in favor of
participation and the right to vote can be overcome when there
appears to be no conflict of interest between insiders and outsiders.
In the absence of such a conflict we have no reason to think that
the preferences of insiders and outsiders are distributed differently
in ways that are normatively troubling. Thus, the policy outcome
will reflect the interests of everyone affected, even nonresidents
who enter the jurisdiction at a later date. Second, the presumption
in favor of participation is not overcome when there does appear to
be a conflict of interest between insiders and outsiders, because
then we do not believe that the policy outcome will reflect the in-
terests of everyone affected.
The El Salvador example, in which citizens of that nation
"share" our foreign policy, suggests that it will be no easy task to
identify when conflicts of interest occur. The difficulty of that task
may ultimately defeat the process theorists' efforts to use their ap-
proach as the basis for a theory of judicial review.39 The conflict of
interest approach does seem to make some headway in determin-
ing the relationship between being affected by a policy and prop-
36. This phrase usually arises in discussions of the takings clause.
37. See, e.g., ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 82-88 (1980); Regan, The Supreme Court
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1091, 1161-63 (1986).
38. A conflict of interest does arise at the moment the nonresident wants to violate the
law. Because an identical conflict arises when some resident wants to violate the law, how-
ever, there is still no conflict of interest between residents and nonresidents as such.
39. I so argue in RED, WHITE AND BLUE, supra note 35.
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erly being denied the right to participate in the making of that
policy.
Perhaps some additional ground may be gained by returning to
the supremacy clause. Democratic theory might support a pre-
sumption in favor of the more inclusive jurisdiction--the nation
rather than the state. The reason is that the more inclusive juris-
diction avoids the problems created by the possibility that the less
inclusive jurisdictions will ignore the interests of affected outsiders
because the more inclusive jurisdiction has fewer outsiders to af-
fect. Nor does a presumption in favor of the more inclusive juris-
diction repudiate all of the values promoted by the existence of
less inclusive ones. Professor Brilmayer emphasizes the value of di-
versity.40 Yet, to the extent that diversity as such is valuable, the
more inclusive jurisdiction can allow as much diversity as its mem-
bers find valuable. Here the relevant doctrine is the law of congres-
sional consent to discriminatory state legislation. Under that law,
Congress-the representative of all the people-can authorize
states to enact legislation that discriminates against nonresidents.4
In doing so, Congress can preserve diversity.
Perhaps, though, diversity as such is not terribly valuable. It
may be nice to live in a society in which Maine differs from Texas
to the degree that it does, but that fact does not really seem to get
at what matters here. Professor Brilmayer's concern is not with di-
versity as such, because she notes that she might prefer that an-
other country be different because it does not reflect her own
tastes, "even [her] own taste to experience something diverse." '42
That is, it is not sufficient that the more inclusive jurisdiction cre-
ate or tolerate diversity for its own reasons; we want the diversity
to arise organically from the "genuine expression of another per-
son's tastes and values." '43
We now can return to the fundamental problem of democratic
theory, which I will present in the context of the right to vote. Vot-
ing has two faces. Process theories stress that voting is the mecha-
nism by which an already constituted political community chooses
the course it wishes to pursue. As this formulation suggests, pro-
cess theories as such cannot produce much insight into the prior
40. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 400.
41. This power is subject to constitutional constraints independent of federalism, such as
the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 10, at 326-37.
42. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 400.
43. Id.
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question of who constitutes the political community." We might
augment process theories by drawing on textual analysis, as Pro-
fessor Brilmayer suggests.45 Thus, the three-fifths clause4 1 can be
read as defining the political community of 1789 to exclude blacks;
"within its jurisdiction," as used in the equal protection clause, 7
may limit the state's duty to nonresidents; and the preamble's ref-
erence to "We the People of the United States, 4 8 might resolve
the question posed by my El Salvador example. The point to stress
here, though, is that these definitions of the political community
come from sources outside process theories.
We can now see why my earlier invocation of the supremacy
clause simply solved the problem by stipulation. A federal system
contains two competing political communities, the state(s) and the
nation. Professor Brilmayer is interested in defining the proper
scope of those competing communities. Stipulating that the
supremacy clause means that the national community prevails over
the local one does not resolve the normative question. Such a stip-
ulation is analogous to resolving the issue by reference to textual
concerns. We need normative reasons grounded in democratic the-
ory to accept the supremacy clause stipulation, just as we do with
textual concerns.
We might begin to think about how to develop such justifica-
tions by considering the second face of voting. The most hard-
edged process theory-public choice theory-explains why votes
should be aggregated according to majority rule. But it notoriously
fails to explain why any rational person would vote in the first
place, given that voting is costly in terms of forgone opportunities
and that each voter's marginal contribution to the outcome is close
to zero. 9 Once we think about real people in real communities, it is
not hard to understand why they-or some of them-vote. Voting
is not only a way by which community constitutes itself; it is a way
for citizens to affiliate themselves with their co-citizens. Indeed,
44. It might be suggested that process theories can at least establish that, insofar as a
right to vote is granted to people within a previously defined community, their votes have to
be counted. One might counter that to the extent that the votes are not counted, the people
discriminated against are not in fact members of the predefined political community.
45. The textual analysis is implicit in Professor Brilmayer's discussion of equal protec-
tion. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 413-15.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. U.S. CONST. preamble.
49. See generally Farber and Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 873, 893-94 (1987).
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the very formality and instrumental pointlessness of the act of vot-
ing makes it a better way of manifesting affiliation than the tacit
consent on which Lockean consent theory places such weight."
The second face of voting explains why nonresidents cannot vote
no matter how much they are affected by a community's selection
of authoritative values. As the theologian Stanley Hauerwas puts
it, " 'the state' is the name we give to those charged with upholding
the patterns of cooperation achieved by our society to preserve our
particular shared goods." And it is the particularity that matters
here-again in Hauerwas' words, "that history that makes a people
a people." 51 Nonresidents, who have not shared in the particular
history that constitutes a community, simply are not members, and
so cannot engage in the acts of affiliation and voting which contrib-
ute to the ongoing reconstitution of the community. 2
Yet the preceding argument moves too quickly. It fails to take
account of several aspects of the process by which communities are
constituted. First, outsiders do contribute to the construction of
the insiders' community. The insiders are who they are, and are
able to conceive of themselves as a distinctive community, at least
in part because they see themselves in opposition to the outsiders.
Without outsiders, insiders could not be insiders; without nonresi-
dents, the concept of residency is empty. 3 To the extent that a
normative conclusion about voting and democracy is sought to be
drawn from the ontological fact of the particular community, out-
siders (who necessarily make such contributions) have as great a
claim as insiders.
In addition, both Professor Brilmayer's presentation and my
comments so far have made particularity something like an unal-
loyed good. It is, in her terms, the "genuine expression of [a
group's] tastes and values"54-and who could quarrel with that?
There is an underside to particularity, though, that should be
noted. To the degree that a community affirms its particularity, it
denies the claims of other communities to their particularities
50. See generally P. SCHUCK AND R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985) (favoring consent as a basis of citizenship).
51. S. HAUERWAS, AGAINST THE NATIONS: WAR AND SURVIVAL IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 188
(1985).
52. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 408-09.
53. There are lots of fancy citations that could support this proposition. One might be to
Hegel's analysis of the mutual dependency of masters and slaves. Another might be to
French feminist theorists of differance. My choice is J.P. SARTRE, ANTI-SEMITE AND JEW
(Schoken ed. 1948).
54. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 400.
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when the two come into contact. That is what produces the dilem-
mas of federalism. Diversity is attractive, but its companion is
prejudice or knowing disregard of other communities. It may not
be accidental that one of Professor Brilmayer's examples counter-
poses New Haven to Paris.5 One might characterize that as
counterposing the metropolis to the provinces. The idea that the
particularity of both the metropolis and the provinces can be pre-
served makes complete sense when held by a resident of the me-
tropolis; things might look different from the provinces. 6 The ulti-
mate goal, and the underlying problem, is that we must somehow
reconcile the particularity of one community with the demands by
other communities for fair treatment.
Our evaluation of the claims of particularity must, as my use of
the terms "metropolis" and "provinces" suggests, itself be particu-
larized to take account of differences in the power of specific com-
munities. When we do so in connection with federalism in the
United States, one fact demands our attention. Communities, I
have argued, are constituted in part by the act of voting. Voter
participation in the United States has been declining for years.5 7
The implication is that the communities that "genuinely express"
their members' values are less and less genuine. We may not have
reached the point of complete homogenization that Professor
Brilmayer decries. Maine is indeed different-to a degree-from
Texas. I suspect, however, that if one were magically transported
on successive days to Bangor, Dallas, and San Salvador, one would
find it rather easier to figure out where one was on the last day
than on the day before. 58 This may account for the attraction of
process theories; they make sense because they provide a norma-
tive justification for the social homogenization that we have al-
ready experienced. Professor Brilmayer apparently regrets that ho-
mogenization, as-to a degree-do I. Given the way things are, her
call for developing a richer democratic theory is simultaneously a
call for a different kind of society.
55. Id.
56. Again, consider the problem of the particularity of the United States when seen from
El Salvador.
57. See, e.g., Abramson & Aldrich, The Decline of Electoral Participation in America,
76 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 502 (1982).
58. This assumes that one puts aside forces of nature such as climate and physical envi-
ronment. I take it to be obvious that one would know that on Monday and Tuesday one was
in the United States and that on Wednesday one was somewhere else. What is at stake,
though, is being able to distinguish between Bangor and Dallas.
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At this point it may be appropriate to enter a word of caution by
directing attention again to the problem of fairness between com-
munities. Particularity is nice, to some extent. The achievement of
the Enlightenment was, in contrast, to insist on the value of uni-
versalism. It is one thing to describe this achievement as celebrat-
ing "some bland abstraction of supposed homogeneous human in-
terests";59 the pejorative tone may appropriately signal that the
Enlightenment's heirs have gone too far. It is entirely another
thing to deny the existence of universal human values.
In the end, that may be the deepest problem for democratic the-
ory, for which federalism is only a metaphor. In a federal system
people are citizens of two (or more) communities; each community
may pursue policies arrived at by democratic processes internal to
it; those policies may conflict. The problem this poses for demo-
cratic theory is obvious: Which of the competing democratic com-
munities would prevail? Now we can eliminate the metaphor. In
any society people are individual human beings who embody their
particular, historically shaped values and the universal values of
the Enlightenment tradition, and they are also members of histori-
cally constituted communities that in an interdependent and post-
Enlightenment world must relate to each other in mutually re-
spectful ways as each of them continually reconstitutes itself. Fur-
ther, and moving even deeper into uncharted fields, there is little
reason to think that those historically constituted communities
have any necessary ties to geography. Those who have thought
about community have identified a community of intellectuals, a
community of proletarians, a community of Jews and one of Mos-
lems, and the like. I suspect that we will get rather little insight on
the problems raised by individuality and communities of this sort
by drawing on such narrow subjects as constitutional law and con-
flict of laws. As Professor Brilmayer says, democratic theory has
barely scratched the surface of the problems this poses.
I happen to believe that there are no answers, and that the
problems simply describe the contradictions of the human condi-
tion."0 It is the merit of Professor Brilmayer's essay that it opens
these issues to view.
59. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 409.
60. Professor Brilmayer's "new model" of concentric circles, id. at 413, does not seem to
me helpful. It is largely descriptive and, so far as I can tell, contains no argument for placing
one relationship in the center and others in rings around the center. I can readily imagine
justifications for essentially all of the variants of the model, each with a different relation-
ship at the core and different orderings of the elements in the rings.
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